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The Political Impact of the Global Crisis in Poland: 
Delayed and Indirect Effects 
Radosław Markowski & Agnieszka Kwiatkowska ∗ 
Abstract: »Die politischen Auswirkungen der globalen Krise in Polen: Verzöger-
te und indirekte Effekte«. While the global economic crisis brought no decrease 
in support of democracy in Poland, its effects turned out to be delayed and in-
direct. In the pre-crisis survey, a great difference in normative visions of de-
mocracy between citizens and MPs, especially concerning economic welfare, 
has been recorded. Citizens expressed a preference for more redistributive and 
protective policies while parliamentarians focused mostly on procedural aspects 
of democracy. Seven years later, we observed a partial convergence of attitudes 
of these two groups: citizens had lowered their economic expectations, while 
for MPs economic and redistributive issues became more salient as essential 
normative characteristics of democracy. However, the extent of this conver-
gence between citizens and political elites differed by political divisions. We 
argue that differences in post-crisis responsiveness of political elites formed 
the basis of a major change in Polish politics after 2015. 
Keywords: Political elites, democracy, economic crisis, Poland, political linkage. 
1.  Introduction 
The general aim of this article is to explain the impact of the global financial 
and economic crisis on support for democracy in a country which, of all coun-
tries of the European Union, has felt its impact the least. As in most of the 
related contributions in this HSR Special Issue, we use a nuanced, multi-
dimensional concept of support for democracy. The overall design of the study 
is comparative: across time – both before and after the crisis; and across the 
two halves of what we term the ‘representative bond’ between members of 
parliament (MPs) and citizens.  
In a more detailed sense, this article aims to answer the following questions. 
First, do attitudes towards three levels of democracy differ among Polish citi-
zens and MPs? Second, how do evaluations of these levels of democracy im-
                                                             
∗  Radosław Markowski, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of Social Sciences and 
Humanities, Chodakowska 19/31, Warszawa 03-815, Poland; rmarkowski@swps.edu.pl. 
Agnieszka Kwiatkowska, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of Social Sciences and 
Humanities, Chodakowska 19/31, Warszawa 03-815, Poland; agn.kwiatkowska@swps.edu.pl. 
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  251 
pact overall assessments of democracy as an ideal and the performance of 
actually-existing democracy? Third, do party elites and party electorates differ 
in their attitudes toward and evaluations of democracy in Poland? Fourth, did 
the global economic crisis and economic slowdown in Poland affect Poles’ 
attitudes towards democracy, both in terms of normative visions and perfor-
mance evaluation?  
It should be emphasized that the Polish case is a somewhat awkward fit for 
the overall design of this study (see Klingemann and Hoffmann-Lange, in this 
issue), as it did not experience a significant crisis in the last decade, apart from 
a relative decline in the pace of its economic growth in 2009. On the other 
hand, political developments in Poland since October 2015 have raised con-
cerns about the predictive powers of political science. In short, while Poland 
has, against the backdrop of other Central and Eastern European cases, proven 
to be a genuine success story in the majority of domains we typically evaluate 
when explaining political stability and democratic consolidation, the country 
currently finds itself in the midst of a major democratic decay. 
There was no indication of a decrease in support for democracy in the post-
economic crisis wave of our study. On the contrary, after the crisis support for 
a democratic political system was more pronounced among the citizens and 
MPs than it had been prior to the crisis. The pre-crisis survey identified a sig-
nificant difference between citizens’ and MPs’ normative visions of democra-
cy, especially with respect to economic welfare. Citizens expressed a prefer-
ence for more redistributive and protective policies, while parliamentarians 
focused mostly on procedural aspects of democracy. Seven years later, we 
observe a partial convergence of attitudes of these two groups: citizens lowered 
their economic expectations, while for MPs economic and redistributive issues 
became more salient as essential normative characteristics of democracy. 
The global crisis not only brought about changes in the meaning of democ-
racy; it also altered the relationship between satisfaction with democracy and 
normative visions of democracy. Among those citizens who emphasized the 
economic and redistributive component as an essential characteristic of democ-
racy, the degree of support for democracy was found to be lower in the post-
crisis survey, because the declining growth rate of the economy could not satis-
fy their policy expectations in line with their normative expectations. However, 
the extent of this convergence between citizens and political elites varied in 
accordance with political divisions. This is the basis of our central argument: 
that differences in the post-crisis responsiveness of political elites formed the 
basis of a major shift in Polish politics after 2015. 
The next section gives a brief description of the Polish case, addressing the 
aforementioned issues and paints a broader picture of Polish development since 
its democratic transformation in the 1980s (for more details on the topic see 
Markowski 2016a, 2016b; Markowski and Kotnarowski 2016; Markowski 
2006). 
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2.  Peculiarities of the Polish Development 
From the very beginning, Polish economic transition was marked by success. 
Poland was the first among all Eastern European countries to overcome the 
deep recession of the early transition period. By 1992, it was already enjoying a 
GDP growth of 2.4%. Over the entirety of the period between 1989 and 2015, 
Poland experienced the highest GDP growth of all Central and Eastern Europe-
an (CEE) countries, amounting to about 230 percent of its 1989 volume1. This 
impressive GDP growth was accompanied by a relatively moderate level of 
inequality (a GINI coefficient of 0.29 in 2016 as compared to 0.36 in 2002) and 
single-digit unemployment hovering between 7-9 percent, depending on the 
method of calculation. Several other Human Development Indices document 
the extraordinarily encouraging developments in Poland, such as increased life 
expectancy for both sexes, significantly lower infant mortality, and a boom in 
educational attainment (Czapinski and Panek 2015; Eurostat 2016). 
The 2015 parliamentary election was distinct for a number of reasons. 
Above all, it was not about the economy. Indeed, evaluations of Poland’s eco-
nomic performance seem not to have been relevant for the decisions made by 
voters. It should be recalled at this point that under the two-term PO-PSL coali-
tion between 2007 and 2015 – a period approximately spanning the global 
crisis – Poland achieved a remarkable cumulative GDP growth of approximate-
ly 24%, accompanied by a decline in income inequalities (Gini coefficient 
0.29), inflation bordering on zero, and single-digit unemployment in 2015 for 
the first time in two decades (Czapinski and Panek 2015; Eurostat 2016). Dur-
ing this period, Poland became increasingly recognized as a political ‘player’, 
in particular within the EU. This was verified by the appointment of Jerzy 
Buzek and Donald Tusk – both major figures in the ruling senior coalition 
party, PO – to key positions within the EU. Yet the response of Poles was 
ambiguous: by the end of 2015, significant majorities of Poles were satisfied 
with their jobs and lives in general (70%) and with their household situation 
(80%) (CBOS 2015, 2016) but remained politically dissatisfied, distrusting 
elites, parties and parliamentarians, and expressing a preoccupation with al-
leged threats to Poland and the Polish way of life emanating from wider global 
forces (Markowski and Tworzecki 2016). 
The events that followed the 2015 parliamentary election were highly sur-
prising from the perspective of existing research: the decline of poverty, ine-
quality and exclusion, and the rising of incomes, accompanied by more than 
two decades of improvement in all macro-economic indicators, should in theo-
ry preclude the possibility of democratic backsliding (Boix 2003; Przeworski et 
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al. 2000). Indeed, the period prior to 2015 saw a steady improvement in evalua-
tions of the quality of democracy (Freedom House, Bertelsmann, Polity indi-
ces), its institutional design, and the compatibility of its parliamentary system 
with democratic consolidation. Over the past 25 years, Poland can claim to 
have met two crucial benchmarks for democratic consolidation. The first of 
these is transition to democracy and a market economy, which was already 
largely accomplished by the mid-1990s, despite the accompanying growth of 
inequalities, social exclusion and massive unemployment. The second bench-
mark was successful preparation for and entry into the European Union, which 
brought about a massive inflow of funds for the development of various sectors 
of the Polish economy.  
The issue of an ‘externally’ or ‘internally’ caused crisis is in a technical 
sense irrelevant, as Poland did not experience a crisis proper. However, two 
connected phenomena are of relevance: (a) a noticeable slow-downturn of GDP 
growth in 2009 in particular (down to 1.7%), although this was not accompa-
nied by a comparable downturn in any other key socio-economic indicators 
(unemployment, inflation, inequality); (b) during the post-2007 period of the 
PO/PSL government, the major opposition party PiS disseminated an ‘alterna-
tive reality’ narrative of a ‘country in ruins’ which, although not based on any 
objective economic facts, proved successful in the 2015 election. 
The relationship between the experience of an economic crisis and the sup-
port of and satisfaction with democracy in the short and the long run has been 
studied extensively (Armingeon and Guthmann 2013; Kroknes et al. 2015; 
Hoffmann-Lange 2015; Cordero and Simón 2016; Pennings 2017). As the 
impact of crises on democratic attitudes and trust in political institutions varied 
across countries, explorative studies searched for causal relations on the indi-
vidual and the country level. Key findings include: a mediating effect of the 
level of education on the visibility of redistributive aspects in the understanding 
of democracy (Norris 2011) and general rise of importance in the conceptual-
ization and evaluation of the performance of democracy via social-democratic 
values and redistributive issues, as well as its dependence on the maturity of 
democracy in a given country (Ferrín and Kriesi 2016; Markowski 2016a). On 
the macro level support for democracy remained greater in countries that expe-
rienced a bailout (Cordero and Simón 2016). 
Poland remained a unique case among European countries because the glob-
al recession had little or no impact (Figure 1). The country did not experience a 
single year of recession after 2007, despite a brief economic slowdown. Poland 
also did not experience negative effects of the economic crisis on the social 
level, such as high unemployment or a crash of the housing market. There was 
no need to introduce austerity programs of the type introduced in many West-
ern European countries. Moreover, political elites, members of the government 
in particular, constantly depicted Poland’s economic growth in a positive light. 
For these reasons, attitudes towards democracy remained relatively unaffected 
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by economic development, both at the level of the masses and of the parliamen-
tary elites. 
Figure 1: Annual % Change of real GDP Growth Rate in 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat (2018). 
 
As a consequence of the lack of a large economic crisis in Poland, Polish atti-
tudes towards economy and democracy proved to be different from the remain-
ing six countries of our study, both at the elite and citizen level. In short, in 
Poland we do not observe any significant general changes between the pre- and 
post-crisis period as far as attitudes towards and the evaluation of the perfor-
mance of democracy are concerned. If anything, there has been a moderate 
growth in positive assessments of the performance of democracy in Poland. 
3. Support for Democracy 
To assess the impact of the global crisis on support for democracy at the level 
of citizens and political elites (MPs) we test several hypotheses, mostly linking 
the evaluation of the state of the economy with attitudes towards democracy, 
both in terms of normative visions of democracy and evaluations of its perfor-
mance.  
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The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, we compare 
changes over time of the attitudes of MPs and citizens. Following Fuchs 
(2007), we distinguish three types of support for democracy: at the value level 
(measured as a general preference for a democratic system and democratic 
values), at the structural level (as an evaluation of democracy in the respond-
ent’s country) and at the process level (as confidence in the political authori-
ties). The second section focuses on the normative aspects of democracy most 
important for the voters and the MPs, and explore the relationship between 
normative expectations and attitudes towards the actually-existing democratic 
regime.  
To conduct these analyses, we use data from two projects. The World Val-
ues Survey (WVS) provides data on the level of citizens. The WVS is a global 
research project that consists of nationally representative surveys conducted in 
almost 100 countries. We use the WVS 1981-2014 Longitudinal Aggregate 
file, focusing on two waves of the study that were conducted before and after 
the global economic crisis: the wave 5 survey, which was in the field in Poland 
during the period 8.12.2005 - 15.12.2005; and the wave 6 survey, which was 
conducted in the period 25.01.2012 - 03.02.2012. Both waves were preceded 
by national parliamentary elections, which took place on 25.09.2005 and 
9.10.2011 (respectively 2.5 and 3.5 months before the WVS fieldwork). 
The Comparative Members of Parliament (CMP) survey provides data on 
the attitudes of members of parliament in Chile, Germany, Poland, South Afri-
ca, South Korea, Sweden and Turkey. The two waves of fieldwork in Poland 
took place before and after the Great Recession. Fieldwork was conducted in 
two periods: 21.05 - 14.08.2007 (first wave) and 11.06 - 24.09.2013 (second 
wave). The CMP project uses core questions of the WVS questionnaires re-
garding MPs attitudes towards democracy, their ideological positions, and their 
confidence in national and international organizations and institutions. The 
second wave of the study introduced new questions about evaluations of the 
economic crisis and assessments of the performance of political and economic 
actors in dealing with its consequences. In order to allow standardized compar-
isons, all variables related to attitudes towards democracy were rescaled to a 
range between 0 and 1, with 0 meaning non-democratic and 1 meaning demo-
cratic. 
3.1  The Value Level: Support for Democracy as a Political System 
The global economic crisis has not weakened preferences for a democratic 
system at the level of political elites and citizens. All Polish MPs (100% in 
2013 and 97.8% in 2007) agreed with the statement that ‘although democracy 
has many shortcomings, it is still better than any other political system’. Ac-
cording to MPs, the financial crisis did not undermine the quality of democracy 
in Poland; indeed, in the second wave, respondents expressed slightly higher 
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(0.59) satisfaction with democracy than in the pre-crisis wave (0.55), although 
the difference was not significant. Examining the various impacts of the crisis 
on their country, they agreed that the most adversely affected areas were the 
economy (on average 0.69 on a 0 to 1- scale, where 0 denotes no negative 
impact at all and 1 denotes a severely negative impact), the people’s standard 
of living (0.66), and, to a lesser extent, the banking system (0.52). At the same 
time, quality of democracy was only slightly affected by the crisis (0.33) in the 
eyes of MPs. 
When comparing attitudes towards the political system, preferences of MPs 
for democracy increased slightly (M1=0.83, M2=0.86) while support for alter-
native systems such as rule by the army (M1=0.08, M2=0.02) or a strong, non-
democratic leader (M1=0.24, M2=0.16) decreased after the crisis. However, in 
the case of democracy as a form of government, effects were not statistically 
significant. In both waves, the vast majority of MPs were critical of non-
democratic forms of government such as a dictatorship or rule by the army. 
About a third of the respondents expressed moderate criticism of dictatorship 
(36.2% in 2007, 37.4% in 2013) calling it ‘fairly bad’, with the number of 
people indicating high concern (‘very bad’) rising from 46.3% in 2007 to 
57.1% in 2013. Juntas, on the other hand, are almost universally abhorred in 
Poland, and increasingly so: the percentage of respondents considering them 
‘very bad’ grew from 77.9% in 2007 to 94.6% in 2013. At the same time, de-
mocracy continues to be the most popular form of government, perceived posi-
tively in almost all cases (only 2 respondents in 2007 and 1 respondent in 2013 
thought it to be ‘fairly bad’), although not flawless (47.7% respondents in 2007 
and 41.5% in 2013 said that democracy was only ‘fairly good’). 
Table 1: Support for Democracy as a Political System – MPs and Citizens 
 Wave Very good 
Fairly 
good 
Fairly 
bad 
Very 
bad Mean SD 
Strong leader 
who does not 
have to bother 
with parliament 
and elections 
CMP 2007 2.1 15.4 36.2 46.3 0.24* 0.27 
CMP 2013 0.7 4.8 37.4 57.1 0.16* 0.21 
WVS 2005 6.9 23.6 43.4 26.1 0.37** 0.29 
WVS 2012 2.9 18.7 44.1 34.3 0.30** 0.27 
Army rule 
 
CMP 2007 0 1.0 21.1 77.9 0.08** 0.15 
CMP 2013 0 0.7 4.8 94.6 0.02** 0.09 
WVS 2005 2.4 19.0 44.0 34.6 0.30 0.26 
WVS 2012 1.1 20.5 44.0 34.4 0.29 0.25 
Democratic 
political system 
CMP 2007 50.3 47.7 2.1 0 0.83 0.18 
CMP 2013 57.8 41.5 0.7 0 0.86 0.17 
WVS 2005 23.3 60.9 13.5 2.2 0.68 0.23 
WVS 2012 20.3 62.9 14.1 2.7 0.67 0.22 
Source: Comparative Members of Parliament 2007&2013, World Value Survey 2005&2012. 
Weighted data. Data rescaled to [0;1] range. Differences of means (M1-M2) significant at the 
0.01 level (2-tailed) are flagged as **, significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) are flagged as *. 
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At the level of citizens, changes in the preferences for different political sys-
tems were no more pronounced. Support for a system governed by a strong 
leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections has fallen 
(M1=0.37, M2=0.30), but changes were insignificant in the cases of army rule 
(M1=0.29, M2=0.30) and a democratic system (M1=0.69, M2=0.67). However, 
only 23.3% of citizens in the first wave and 20.3% in the second wave regarded 
democracy as ‘a very good’ political system, compared with, respectively, 
50.3% and 57.8% in case of the MPs (see Table 1). 
Comparing elite and mass preferences for different political systems, MPs 
express clearly more democratic attitudes in all three cases. Using the measure 
of unequivocal preference for democracy over an authoritarian system (Hoff-
man-Lange, 2015), the percentage of respondents who give a democratic sys-
tem a higher rating than any of the two authoritarian systems, was, in case of 
MPs, 97.2% and 100% in consecutive waves, and 74.6% and 77.0% when 
citizens were surveyed. More than twice the percentage of MPs in the pre-crisis 
study and nearly three times the percentage in the post-crisis study argue that 
democracy is a ‘very good’ system. Moreover, while among MPs on average 
only 1.5% consider democracy to be fairly or very bad, this opinion is held by 
more than 16% of citizens. MPs express also much more negative judgements 
regarding non-democratic systems.  
These results place Poland in the lowest rank among the seven countries an-
alyzed when it comes to popular support for democracy, comparable to South 
Korea in both waves of the study (with means equal to 0.64 and 0.63 respec-
tively) and to South Africa in the second wave (0.66). Conversely, in other 
European countries support for democracy is much more pronounced (Sweden: 
0.91 and 0.89; Germany: 0.84 and 0.86). When it comes to support for authori-
tarian government, only South Africa (0.34 and 0.48) and Turkey (0.39 and 
0.33) express greater acceptance of army rule, while in South Korea (0.47, 
0.49), South Africa (0.42, 0.56), Turkey (0.54, 0.54) and – in the second wave 
only – Chile (0.39), the proportion of respondents who favor a strong leader 
who does not have to bother with parliament and elections is higher than in 
Poland. Among citizens of Sweden and Germany support for authoritarian 
government is much lower than in Poland: in the case of a strong non-
democratically controlled leader (Germany: 0.21 and 0.24; Sweden 0.22 and 
0.30) and especially in the case of army rule (Germany 0.07 and 0.09, Sweden 
0.12 and 0.17). 
The same applies to the Polish political elites. Despite displaying much 
more pro-democratic attitudes as compared to the general public and their 
counterparts in other countries, they have the lowest level of support for de-
mocracy as a regime type (and this difference is statistically significant in all 
cases except for South Korea in the first wave). At the same time virtually all 
German and Swedish MPs assess democracy as a ‘very good’ system (with 
averages in both waves equal to 0.99 in Germany and 1.00 in Sweden).  
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In comparative perspective, Polish MPs also express high levels of ac-
ceptance for an authoritarian system with a strong leader: in the first wave of 
the study only Turkey displays higher enthusiasm towards authoritarian leaders 
(0.40), while in Germany and Sweden almost all MPs describe such a system 
as ‘very bad’ (with a mean of 0.02 for both countries). In the second wave of 
the study, acceptance of authoritarian leaders by the members of the Polish 
parliament decreased, yet only Chilean MPs expressed greater support for this 
system (0.27), differences with South Korea (0.20) and Turkey (0.22) were not 
significant, and in Germany (0.02), Sweden (0.05) and South Africa (0.07) the 
corresponding figures were much lower. In the case of attitudes towards rule by 
the army, there are significantly fewer differences, with Poland closer to the 
cross-national average. 
3.2 The Structural Level: Evaluation of Democracy in the 
Respondent's Own Country 
At the structural level, measured by the evaluation of democratic governance in 
the respondent’s own country, there are large differences between elites and 
citizens (see Table 2). The former assess the political system of the country as 
rather democratic, while the latter place the country just above the mid-point of 
the scale. These evaluations and differences remain, on the macro level, stable 
across time. There is no significant difference in the position of citizens at the 
two time points (M1=0.53, M2=0.54). In both cases, the majority of citizens 
express attitudes close to the mid-point of the scale. On average, MPs evaluate 
the Polish political system as moderately or highly democratic. Although the 
mean assessment of democracy barely changes (M1=0.70, M2=0.71), the group 
that has a very positive evaluation of democracy (the three highest points of the 
scale) increases from 47.9% to 56.1%. 
Table 2: Evaluation of the Polish Democratic Regime – MPs and Citizens 
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CMP 2007 0 2.5 0.7 12.6 8.5 14.9 12.8 0 24.3 23.6 0.70 0.26 
CMP 2013 0 4.1 5.4 4.1 8.1 6.1 16.2 20.3 16.2 19.6 0.71 0.25 
WVS 2005 4.3 2.6 7.3 8.2 23.2 16.7 17.8 13.8 3.1 3.1 0.53 0.23 
WVS 2012 3.9 3.2 8.6 8.6 18.1 15.5 17.6 14.1 4.7 5.7 0.54 0.24 
Source: Comparative Members of Parliament 2007&2013, World Value Survey 2005&2012. 
Weighted data. Data rescaled to [0;1] range. Differences of means (M1-M2) significant at the 
0.01 level (2-tailed) are flagged as **, significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) are flagged as *. 
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Comparing the figures in Poland with those in other countries, we find that 
Polish citizens have a lower opinion of the condition of democracy’s perfor-
mance in their country than do citizens of nearly all countries in the study, in 
both waves. In all other cases, the averages are significantly higher than in 
Poland (the highest mean being found in Sweden: 0.73 and 0.72 respectively), 
with the exception of two cases where the difference is insignificant: Turkey in 
the first wave (0.56) and South Korea in the second wave (0.54). 
While both citizens and MPs maintain stable average positions, declining 
evaluations of the democratic regimes in most countries (Germany: 0.83 to 
0.78, South Africa: 0.84 to 0.78, South Korea: 0.72 to 0.60, Turkey: 0.63 to 
0.56) have changed the relative position of Polish MPs. In the first wave, Ger-
many, South Africa, and Sweden showed much higher levels of support for 
their democratic regimes than did their counterparts in Chile, South Korea, 
Turkey and Poland. In the second wave, the mean evaluation of Polish MPs is 
not significantly different from Chile, Germany and South Africa, while in 
Sweden the proportion of those who positively evaluate the performance of 
their democratic regime remains higher (0.89 in both waves), and in South 
Korea and Turkey the proportions are lower. 
3.3  The Process Level: Support for Democratic Political Authorities 
The process level refers to trust in three key national political institutions: 
political parties, parliament and government. Lack of trust in political institu-
tions is a long-term phenomenon in Poland, with levels of trust very poor even 
after 25 years of a functioning pluralistic democratic system (CBOS 2014). 
Low levels of trust in key political institutions are typical for Central and East-
ern Europe in general, while the highest confidence levels are expressed in 
Northern Europe (van der Meer 2017). 
The confidence of MPs and citizens in all three democratic institutions (po-
litical parties, parliament, government) is mostly low (see Table 3), and it is 
lowest in the case of political parties. The majority of citizens and parliamen-
tarians have ‘not very much’ trust in political parties. However, the average 
level of trust is much lower among citizens. Comparing levels of trust in politi-
cal parties among MPs with their trust in other public organizations, only in the 
case of the media – including the press (M1=0.29, M2=0.25) and the television 
(M1=0.30, M2=0.27) – was there a significantly lower level of confidence, as 
was the case for labor unions (M1=0.35, M2=0.26) in the second wave. At the 
level of citizens, trust in political parties ranked the lowest compared to all 
other organizations. 
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Table 3:  Support for Democratic Political Authorities: Confidence in Major 
Political Institutions – MPs and Citizens 
 None  at all 
Not very 
much 
Quite a 
lot 
A great 
deal Mean SD 
Confidence in political parties 
CMP 2007 4.9 75.5 23.4 1.1 0.40 0.18 
CMP 2013 10.1 67.6 20.9 1.4 0.38 0.20 
WVS 2005 41.7 51.3 6.5 0.5 0.22 0.21 
WVS 2012 37.7 54.6 7.5 0.2 0.23 0.20 
Confidence in national parliament 
CMP 2007 2.4 40.2 50.9 6.5 0.54 0.22 
CMP 2013 6.2 31.0 54.5 8.3 0.55 0.24 
WVS 2005 32.1 55.7 10.8 1.4 0.27 0.22 
WVS 2012 28.6 59.7 11.5 0.3 0.28 0.21 
Confidence in national government 
CMP 2007 24.2 32.8 28.3 14.7 0.44 0.34 
CMP 2013 29.0 19.3 37.2 14.5 0.46 0.35 
WVS 2005 26.6 55.5 15.3 2.7 0.31 0.24 
WVS 2012 26.7 56.6 16.3 0.4 0.30 0.22 
Source: Comparative Members of Parliament 2007&2013, World Value Survey 2005&2012. 
Weighted data. Data rescaled to [0;1] range. Differences of means (M1-M2) significant at the 
0.01 level (2-tailed) are flagged as **, significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) are flagged as *. 
 
Of the three institutions discussed, citizens are most likely to trust the national 
government, while MPs place most confidence in parliament. This trend exists 
in most countries (with the exception of Germany and Sweden at the MP level, 
where political parties are trusted more than the government), although some-
times the difference is not significant. Nevertheless, the average levels of con-
fidence in parties, parliaments and governments are low in all seven countries, 
both among citizens and MPs. The impact of the crisis on these attitudes is 
insignificant in Poland at both levels.  
In summary, among citizens the highest levels of support are for democracy 
as a form of government, that is as a set of values. If we consider the structural 
dimension, that is the evaluation of the democratic political regime in Poland as 
it actually operates, support is only moderate, and it at its lowest when the 
focus is on the political process and key actors or institutions. Political elites 
tend to display rather high levels of support for democracy at the value and 
structure level, while support is below average when it comes to the process 
level. In comparative cross-national perspective, Poland has the lowest levels 
of trust in political institutions. 
What is interesting is the relatively low correlation between these three lev-
els of support: values, structure and process (see Table 4). In both waves, citi-
zens who think that having a democratic system in a country is good tend to 
have a more positive evaluation of the actual democratic regime and more 
confidence in political parties. In the post-crisis wave, the relationship between 
their normative stance about democracy and the evaluation of the performance 
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of the system is slightly stronger, yet the relationship between support of de-
mocracy and confidence in political parties has slightly diminished. At the level 
of parliamentary elites, in the first wave there is no significant relationship 
between support for democracy as a political system and evaluation of the 
functioning of the Polish democracy. This result is however “created” almost 
exclusively by the very high appreciation of democracy as a value by the par-
liamentary elites and the fact that almost all of those who evaluate the function-
ing of the Polish democracy positively at the same time support democracy as a 
system2. In the second wave the picture is slightly different. We note a decline 
in the relationship between positive assessments of the quality of democracy in 
the respondent’s own country and confidence in political parties. In both 
waves, support for democracy as a political system is not related to confidence 
in political parties. 
Table 4:  Pearson’s Correlations Between the Degree of Support for Democracy 
on Three Levels – MPs and Citizens 
  Having a democrat-ic political system 
Extent of democracy 
in own country 
Confidence in  
political parties 
WVS: Having a demo-
cratic political system 1 .116 (.001)** .088(.012)* 
WVS: Extent of democ-
racy in own country .157(.000)** 1 .247(.000)** 
WVS: Confidence in 
political parties .086(.014)* .161(.000)** 1 
CMP: Having a demo-
cratic political system 1 -.181(.123) -.149(.154) 
CMP: Extent of democ-
racy in own country .401(.000)** 1 .448(.000)** 
CMP: Confidence in 
political parties .102(.233) .245(.004)** 1 
Source: World Value Survey 2005 (bold text) & 2012, Comparative Members of Parliament 
2007 (bold text) & 2013. Weighted data. Correlations significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) are 
flagged as **, significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) are flagged as *. 
3.4  Differences in Support for Democracy 
Support for democracy differs in subgroups of the analyzed populations. In the 
MP study, both waves show significant differences regarding support for de-
mocracy with respect to values, structure and process. MPs support for democ-
racy as a set of values differs significantly between MPs of the pro-liberal-
democratic center-right Civic Platform (PO) and the anti-liberal right-wing 
Law and Justice (PiS). On the other hand, levels of structural and process eval-
                                                             
2  Data not shown, available upon request from the authors. 
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uations vary in accordance with the government-opposition role of the parties 
(see Table 5). 
Table 5: Support for Democracy by Parliamentary Club 
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CMP 
2007 
PiS Mean 0.76 0.38 0.07 0.94 0.51 0.68 0.69 
PO Mean 0.95 0.09 0.07 0.54 0.32 0.43 0.17 
SRP Mean 0.78 0.33 0.14 0.76 0.44 0.53 0.61 
LiD/SLD Mean 0.84 0.16 0.00 0.45 0.31 0.42 0.18 
LPR Mean 0.73 0.33 0.20 0.78 0.40 0.57 0.67 
PSL Mean 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.57 0.30 0.47 0.13 
Total Mean 0.83 0.24 0.08 0.71 0.40 0.54 0.44 
CMP 
2013 
PiS Mean 0.81 0.21 0.03 0.47 0.35 0.42 0.10 
PO Mean 0.91 0.14 0.01 0.90 0.44 0.68 0.75 
SLD Mean 0.88 0.08 0.04 0.71 0.38 0.50 0.17 
PSL Mean 0.81 0.15 0.00 0.83 0.33 0.56 0.70 
RP Mean 0.86 0.12 0.02 0.55 0.23 0.41 0.28 
Total Mean 0.87 0.16 0.02 0.71 0.38 0.56 0.47 
Source: Comparative Members of Parliament 2007&2013. Weighted data. Data rescaled to 
[0;1] range. 
 
The degree of support for democracy as a set of values shows significant dif-
ferences between the two major parties in 2007 (MPO1=0.95, MPiS1=0.76), at a 
time when the government was led by one of those parties, PiS. While the vast 
majority of MPs from PO claimed that having a democratic system was very 
good (82.8%) and 17.2% that it was fairly good, PiS MPs primarily evaluated 
democracy as a fairly good system (63.6%; followed by: ‘very good’ – 33,3% 
and ‘fairly bad’ – 3.0%). In the post-crisis study, when PO was the main party 
in office, the difference between party elites on this question was smaller, but 
still significant (MPO2=0.91, MPiS2=0.81). In 2013, the ratio of ‘very good’ to 
‘fairly good’ assessments of democracy as a system of government declines 
among PO MPs from 3 to 1 (precisely, 74.2% to 25.8%). At the same time, 
compared with the first wave a larger proportion of PiS MPs claim that democ-
racy is a very good system (45.2%), while fewer claim that it is a fairly good 
(52.4%) or a fairly bad (2.4%) system. When it comes to support for an au-
thoritarian government with a strong leader, in the first wave of the study we 
find a large difference between the pro-democratic PO (MPO1=0.09) and the less 
democratic PiS (MPIS1=0.38). However, this difference is insignificant in the 
second wave. All parties reject a government led by the army. 
The evaluation of the democratic regime in the respondent’s own country is 
strongly determined by whether the respondent’s party is in government or in 
opposition. During the pre-crisis study, with PiS the senior partner of a gov-
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ernmental coalition, its parliamentarians evaluated democracy in Poland close 
to the maximum of the scale (MPiS1=0.94, with 96.3% of PiS MPs on maximum 
of ‘10’). At the same time, MPs of PO, which was the main opposition party at 
the time, had a much lower opinion of the quality of democracy (MPO1=0.54), 
with none claiming that the country was fully democratic. Other opposition 
parties, such as the Left and Democrats (LiD) coalition led by the post-
communist Alliance of Democratic Left (SLD, MSLD1=0.45), had an even lower 
opinion of the level of democracy. 
This trend was reversed in 2013, when the parliamentary club of the incum-
bent Civil Platform expressed relatively high evaluations of democracy in 
Poland (MPO2=0.90, 43.5% on the maximum point of the scale), while PiS MPs 
declared their disillusionment with the democratic progress of the country 
(MPiS2=0.47). Not only did the positions of the main parties significantly 
change, PSL (the agrarian Polish Peasant Party, the minor coalition government 
partner) unveiled high levels of support for the Polish democratic regime, while 
SLD members placed themselves close to the center of the scale.  
Finally, the government-opposition dynamic is still visible in all three as-
pects of the process dimension, but to a lesser extent. The negative attitude 
towards political parties is so unanimous that only one type of difference be-
tween the parties is significant: the main opposition party is more distrustful of 
political parties than the main government party, both in the 2007 wave 
(MPiS1(government)=0.51, MPO1(opposition)=0.32) and in the 2013 wave (MPiS2 
(opposition) =0.35, MPO2(government)=0.44). These differences in attitudes are 
much more pronounced when the confidence in parliament and government is 
at stake. In this case two political blocs emerge, with government parties (in 
2007 PiS and minor government parties: League of Polish Families (LPR) and 
Samoobrona RP (SRP); in 2013: PO and PSL) expressing significantly more 
confidence than opposition parties. Not surprisingly, in both waves the largest 
differences regarding attitudes towards government are between the main par-
ties of government and opposition (2007: MPiS1=0.69, MPO1=0.17; 2013: 
MPO2=0.75, MPiS2=0.10). 
At the level of citizens, support for democracy appears to be a consequence 
of electoral choice, although the differences among voters are smaller than 
those between parliamentary clubs. The differences between voters of the main 
political parties (PO and PiS) towards the normative idea of democracy as a 
political system are significant only in the second wave, following a decline in 
pro-democratic attitudes among PiS voters. The most authoritarian attitudes are 
expressed in the second wave by the electorates of the previous minor govern-
ment parties SRP and LPR which did not manage to cross the electoral thresh-
old and thus did not return to parliament during the second wave of the study. 
The differences in the attitudes of voters of the two main parties with respect 
to the regime and process levels, i.e. appreciation of the way democracy works 
and confidence in democratic political institutions are similar to those observed 
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  264 
at the level of MPs. The electorate of the governing party is more likely than 
that of the opposition party to claim that the country is democratic, or to ex-
press support for key national authorities. However, differences between vot-
ers, and their change over time, are much less substantial than those among 
parliamentary elites. Differences in levels of support for democracy and confi-
dence in parliament and government increase after the crisis, with voters of PiS 
(at that time the main party of opposition) much more disenchanted with the 
quality of democracy in Poland than voters of PO, the party of the incumbent 
government. Finally, voters of government and opposition parties alike show a 
lack of approval for political parties in general (differences in this case are not 
significant in either wave). 
Table 6: Support for Democracy by Party Supporters 
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WVS 
2005 
PiS Mean 0.69 0.41 0.30 0.58 0.27 0.33 0.41 
PO Mean 0.73 0.29 0.28 0.54 0.24 0.30 0.33 
PSL Mean 0.75 0.37 0.24 0.52 0.23 0.35 0.38 
SLD Mean 0.70 0.35 0.29 0.45 0.17 0.21 0.21 
SRP Mean 0.59 0.47 0.41 0.44 0.24 0.23 0.27 
LPR Mean 0.65 0.45 0.42 0.55 0.20 0.25 0.37 
Total Mean 0.70 0.38 0.31 0.54 0.25 0.30 0.35 
WVS 
2012 
PiS Mean 0.64 0.30 0.36 0.45 0.27 0.26 0.25 
PO Mean 0.72 0.29 0.28 0.65 0.27 0.37 0.41 
PSL Mean 0.64 0.37 0.38 0.52 0.27 0.30 0.33 
SLD Mean 0.73 0.31 0.30 0.57 0.29 0.34 0.32 
RP Mean 0.67 0.27 0.29 0.57 0.22 0.26 0.27 
Total Mean 0.69 0.30 0.31 0.57 0.27 0.32 0.33 
Source: World Value Survey 2005&2012. Weighted data. Main parties only (20 or more re-
spondents). Data rescaled to [0;1] range. 
 
The greatest change of attitudes in the electorate occurred among PiS voters 
(see Table 6), whose positions changed significantly towards an anti-
democratic direction at all levels (with two exceptions: their support for an 
authoritarian strong leader fell, while their very low confidence in political 
parties remained stable). This pattern was reflected by the changes observed in 
the case of the parliamentary elite: PiS MPs displayed lower levels of support 
for a strong leader, but also significantly lower levels of support for democracy 
and confidence in political institutions. The extent of change was much more 
limited in the case of other parties. MPs and voters of Civic Platform and the 
Alliance for Democratic Left showed significant but smaller changes in support 
of democracy and – to a different degree – in support of democratic political 
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institutions. However, their attitudes towards democracy at the level of values 
remained stable.  
Summarizing the differences in attitudes towards democracy, support for 
democracy as a political system (value level) reflects a long-term difference 
between the two main political parties: MPs and voters of Civic Platform are 
more democratic, while their Law and Justice counterparts are more authoritar-
ian. On the other hand, differences regarding support of the democratic system 
in the respondent’s own country (structure level) and confidence in political 
parties (process level) are primarily a function of position in the political sys-
tem as a party of government or opposition. These patterns are more pro-
nounced among MPs, while they are less visible among the electorate. 
David Easton distinguishes between specific and diffuse support. The for-
mer is based on individual perceptions of actual policies and the actions of 
authorities, and an evaluation of whether citizens demands are met, whereas 
‘the level of diffuse support will normally be independent of outputs and per-
formance in the short run [and as an] attachment to political objects for their 
own sake, will not be easily dislodged because of current dissatisfaction with 
what the government does’ (Easton 1975, 445). Our analyses show that stable 
support for democracy among MPs and voters, independently of their party’s 
current position in the political system, occurs precisely on the level of demo-
cratic values. 
4.  Normative Visions of Democracy 
4.1  Essential Characteristics of Democracy 
Which characteristics are considered by MPs to be essential components of 
democracy? In short, most of the characteristics listed in Table 7 are considered 
important. Respondents were asked to evaluate these characteristics using a 10-
point scale, with 10 denoting ‘an essential characteristic of democracy’. In both 
waves, nearly all thirteen characteristics (progressive taxation, human right to 
dignity, free elections, unemployment benefits, civil rights, a prosperous econ-
omy, women's rights, freedom to criticize government, equality of votes, provi-
sion of the basic needs of citizens, jobs for all, equal opportunity in education, 
and minority rights) were, on average, rated above the mid-point of the scale. 
No fewer than three components of democracy in the first wave and six in the 
second wave received a mean assessment of above 9. These were the human 
right to dignity (2013 only), free elections (2007 and 2013), civil rights (2013 
only), women’s rights (2007 and 2013), equality of votes (2007 and 2013), and 
minority rights (2013 only). 
Furthermore, in all thirteen cases evaluations of whether a particular criteri-
on is an essential component of democracy have increased in intensity between 
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2007 and 2013 (in seven cases significantly, see Table 7). This seems to sug-
gest that Polish MPs are beginning to define ‘democracy’ in a broader and at 
the same time more specific way. Democracy is no longer just regarded a pro-
cedural mechanism of decision-making. It is seen as relevant to a wide range of 
substantive domains of life, including economic welfare, social justice and 
citizens’ needs (see as well Ferrín and Kriesi 2016; Markowski 2016a). Out of 
these seven, four aspects are concerned with economic issues (progressive 
taxation, unemployment benefits, prosperous economy, full employment econ-
omy), two with procedural aspects (free elections, equality of vote) and one 
with individual rights. 
Table 7: Essential Characteristics of Democracy, MPs  
 2007 2013 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor 4.24** 2.4 5.29** 2.8 
The individual human right to dignity is upheld 8.94* 2.2 9.51* 0.9 
People choose their leaders in free elections 9.27* 1.8 9.76* 0.6 
People receive state aid for unemployment 5.56* 2.6 6.41* 2.4 
Civil rights protect peoples liberty against 
oppression 
8.98 2.0 9.43 1.1 
The economy is prospering 6.97* 2.9 7.88* 2.3 
Women have the same rights as men 9.40 1.8 9.45 1.2 
Complete freedom for anyone to criticize the 
government 
7.52 2.9 8.23 1.9 
Equality of vote in elections 9.32* 1.7 9.74* 0.750
Basic necessities like shelter, food and water for 
everyone 
6.38 3.0 6.75 2.9 
Jobs for everyone 4.96* 2.8 5.87* 2.8 
Equal opportunity in education 8.45 2.2 8.87 1.8 
Minority rights 8.61 2.1 9.06 1.6 
Source: Comparative Members of Parliament dataset 2007&2013, Poland. Weighted data. 
Differences of means (M1-M2) significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) are flagged as **, signifi-
cant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) are flagged as *. 
 
On the level of citizens, we observe the opposite pattern. The average ratings of 
the seven items asked in the 2005 and 2012 waves of the World Values Survey 
were lower in comparison with the ratings of the elites (Table 8). Furthermore, 
the assessment of all characteristics as essential for democracy has declined 
between the two waves. This decline was significant in the case of two out of 
five items (progressive taxation, unemployment benefits). While the majority 
of characteristics were graded, on average, above the mid-point of the scale, the 
overall linkage between these characteristics and democracy as a system of 
government is lower in the case of citizens compared with MPs. Only one 
aspect (equal rights for men and women in the 2005 WVS wave) received a 
mean assessment above 9, and as such was seen as ‘very essential’ by citizens.  
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Table 8: Essential Characteristics of Democracy, Citizens 
  WVS 2005                     WVS 2012 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Governments tax the rich and subsidize the 
poor. 6.22** 2.7 5.70** 2.8 
People choose their leaders in free elections. 8.69 2.0 8.73 2.1 
People receive state aid for unemployment. 7.33** 2.6 6.99** 2.7 
Civil rights protect people’s liberty against 
oppression. 8.48 2.0 8.42 2.2 
The economy is prospering. 8.22 2.2   
Criminals are severely punished. 7.73 2.8   
People can change the laws in referendums. 8.40 2.1   
Women have the same rights as men. 9.03 1.8 8.85 2.1 
The state makes people's incomes equal.   5.34 3.0 
People obey their rulers.   4.19 2.8 
Source: World Value Survey 2005&2012. Weighted data. Differences of means (M1-M2) signif-
icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) are flagged as **, significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) are 
flagged as *. 
 
Comparisons between the responses of MPs and citizens reveals that citizens 
emphasize the economic-redistributive elements of democracy to a greater 
extent than do MPs. The positions of MPs and citizens have converged to some 
extent in the post-crisis study: we observe an increase in the salience of eco-
nomic elements as essential characteristics of democracy for MPs, but a de-
crease as far as citizens are concerned (Table 9). However, the difference be-
tween elites and citizens has remained significant. Only five characteristics of a 
normative vision of democracy have been monitored in all surveys we use in 
this study (WVS 5, WVS 6, CMP 1 and CMP 2), as follows: ‘Governments tax 
the rich and subsidize the poor’; ‘People choose leaders in free elections’; 
‘People receive state aid for unemployment’; ‘Civil rights protect people's 
liberty against oppression’; and ‘Women have the same rights as men’. This 
limits the extent to which we can compare the attitudes of MPs and citizens. 
We use this set of items to compare differences in normative visions of de-
mocracy and their change over time across the four main political parties repre-
sented in the Sejm during the two waves of our surveys: PO, PiS, SLD and 
PSL. Due to the low number of respondents in some cases, most of these com-
parisons will be restricted to the two main parties: PiS and PO. 
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Table 9:  Essential Characteristics of Democracy by Parliamentary Club and 
Citizens 
 
Gov't tax  
the rich 
Free  
elections 
Unemploy-
ment aid 
Civil  
rights 
Women's 
rights 
MPs 
PiS 
M1 5.05 * 9.61  5.82* 9.32  9.83** 
M2 6.47 * 9.81  7.24* 9.16  9.05** 
PO 
M1 3.08* 9.48  4.22** 9.18 9.46  
M2 4.37* 9.73  5.76** 9.71 9.82 
LiD/ 
SLD 
M1 4.85 9.13  7.08 9.14 9.07 
M2 7.38 9.63  8.00 9.63 9.88 
PSL 
M1 2.70 ** 10.00  7.11 8.78 9.10  
M2 6.44 ** 9.67  7.22  8.89 8.56 
Voters 
PiS 
M1 6.40* 8.73 7.57 8.56 8.91 
M2 5.74* 8.55 7.04 8.21 8.68 
PO 
M1 6.01 9.11 7.28 8.85 9.35** 
M2 5.49 8.98 7.24 8.58 8.86** 
LiD/ 
SLD 
M1 6.43 8.71 6.75 8.48 9.08 
M2 6.51 9.09 7.19 8.72 9.14 
PSL 
M1 7.28 8.93 7.86* 8.76* 9.34 
M2 6.03 8.14 6.50* 7.67* 8.94 
Source: World Value Survey 2005&2012, Comparative Members of Parliament 2007&2013. 
Weighted data. Differences of means (M1-M2) significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) are 
flagged as **, significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) are flagged as *. 
 
As previously mentioned, the largest increase in salience between the two 
waves of the study relates – at the levels of parliamentary elites and voters – to 
the economic-redistributive aspects of democracy. There is a striking difference 
between the pre-crisis and post-crisis positions of elites regarding the im-
portance of progressive taxation and unemployment benefits. The average 
positions of the two main parties – PiS and PO – have risen by about 1.5 points 
on the 1-10 scale (taxes: PiS: 5.1 to 6.5; PO: 31 to 4.4; unemployment aid: 5.8 
to 7.2; PO: 4.2 to 5.8), but the distance between parties remains constant. At 
the same time, the electorates of these parties have lowered their redistributive 
expectations regarding democracy, with this shift more clearly in evidence 
among PiS voters. 
In the first wave, PiS MPs were, on average, closer to their party’s voters 
regarding economic issues than PO MPs were to their electorate. Their mean 
position on progressive taxation was 1.35 points lower on a scale of 1-10, and 
their mean position on unemployment aid was 1.75 points lower. The distances 
of the mean positions of PO elites and voters were much higher: PO deputies 
diverged from their electorate by an average of 2.93 in case of progressive 
taxation and by 3.06 points regarding unemployment aid. The convergence of 
the attitudes of MPs and voters was stronger in the case of PiS than in the case 
of PO prior to the post-crisis wave of the study. While PO MPs reduced the 
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distance to their own voters by more than half (from 2.93 to 1.12 points regard-
ing progressive taxation and from 3.06 to 1.48 regarding unemployment bene-
fits), PiS MPs shifted their average position by such a remarkable amount that 
they occupied the central ideological position for their supporters and for voters 
in general. The distance between PiS MPs and voters in the post-crisis wave 
has fallen to 0.73 and 0.2 points respectively, and these differences are statisti-
cally insignificant. During the crisis, the attitudes of both main parliamentary 
parties have changed. PiS has more strongly emphasized redistributive ele-
ments in its normative vision of democracy, meeting the expectations of voters. 
4.2  Different Visions of Democracy and Support for Democracy 
The relationship between normative visions of democracy held by MPs and 
their support for democracy as a political system is mostly limited to citizen 
rights: those who support democracy as a political system tend to assume to a 
greater extent that its essential characteristics are the protection of minority 
rights (Pearson’ r=0.383, p=.000 in the first wave; r=0.323, p=.000 in the sec-
ond wave), civil rights as the protection of people against oppression (r=0.209, 
p=.011), second wave) and guaranteeing the individual human right to dignity 
(0.230 (p=.042)). Respect for minority rights is the only variable significantly 
linked to support of democracy in both waves of the study. 
The biggest changes concern support for democracy in the respondent’s own 
country. In the pre-crisis wave of surveys, support for the Polish democratic 
regime is not related to any element of the normative visions of democracy. 
After the crisis, all elements related to the redistributive characteristics of de-
mocracy show a significant and negative correlation with support for the Polish 
democratic regime. As Table 10 shows, satisfaction with the performance of 
the democratic regime is mostly associated with redistributive aspects of de-
mocracy. In fact, all four issues indicative of social justice (high taxes to subsi-
dize the poor, jobs for everyone, state provision of basic necessities like shelter, 
food and water for everyone, and state aid for the unemployed) have changed 
in line with our expectation of growing support for an output-related democra-
cy. Yet the more MPs recognize economic issues as essential characteristics of 
democracy, the more they are dissatisfied with the overall performance of the 
Polish democratic regime, as government policies regarding economic inclu-
sion fail to deliver. In contrast, viewing the inclusion of minority groups or an 
emphasis on women’s rights as essential elements of democracy correlates with 
a support for democracy in general and the positive evaluation of the democrat-
ic regime in Poland. 
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Table 10: Correlations between MPs’ Ideological Positions and Support for the 
Polish Democratic Regime 2007-2013 
 2007 2013 
Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor 0.070 -.165** 
The individual human right to dignity (e.g. respect of 
others) is upheld 
0.196 0.062 
People choose their leaders in free elections 0.198 -0.036 
People receive state aid for unemployment -0.003 -.186** 
Civil rights protect peoples liberty against oppression 0.054 0.111 
The economy is prospering -0.058 -0.007 
Women have the same rights as men 0.104 0.130 
Complete freedom for anyone to criticize the govern-
ment 
-0.183 0.007 
Equality of the vote in elections 0.134 0.067 
Basic necessities like shelter, food and water for 
everyone 
-0.004 -.178** 
Jobs for everyone 0.009 -.188** 
Equal opportunity in education 0.067 -0.030 
Minority rights -0.026 .263** 
Source: Comparative Members of Parliament 2007&2013, Poland. Weighted data. Correlations 
significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) are flagged as **, significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
are flagged as *. 
5.  Summary 
In the absence of a real economic crisis in Poland, no decrease in support for 
democracy was observed. If anything, pro-democratic attitudes increased, both 
among members of the Parliament and among citizens. MPs perceived the 
impact of the crisis on the country to be quite severe, with the most affected 
areas the economy and living standards, and, to a lesser extent, the banking 
system. At the same time, they viewed the crisis as having only a moderate 
impact on the quality of democracy. 
In general, MPs express more pro-democratic attitudes than citizens. Alt-
hough democratic attitudes prevail (at the level of values), both MPs and citi-
zens are highly dissatisfied with the actual functioning of democracy (especial-
ly at the process level). However, cross-country comparisons of the attitudes of 
citizens and political elites indicate that support for democracy in Poland is 
relatively low, and support for a strong leader is relatively high, to an extent 
comparable with Chile and South Korea. Attitudes towards army rule in Poland 
are close to the cross-national average. Support for democracy depends heavily 
on the political affiliations of MPs and citizens. In both cases, support for de-
mocracy as a political system (at the level of values) reflects the long-term 
difference between the two main political parties: liberal Civic Platform (PO) 
and the more nationalistic Law and Justice party (PiS). Differences with respect 
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to support for the Polish democratic regime (the level of structure) and confi-
dence in political parties (the level of process) are primarily a function of the 
party’s role as a party of government or opposition. We may therefore conclude 
that support for democracy as a system of government is strong. This is in line 
with Easton’s (1975) concept of diffuse support.  
As far as support for the Polish democratic regime and its performance is 
concerned, this appears to be the product of specific rather than diffuse support. 
This is a cause for concern, as it indicates that even members of the political 
elite do not seem to have an abstract vision of democratic institutions; instead, 
their attitudes towards the current parliament or government inform their sup-
port for democratic institutions in general. The lack of any common vision of 
democracy at the level of political elites and citizens alike hinders the ability of 
both sides to objectively evaluate the performance of democracy and to appre-
ciate the importance of democratic rules of the game, regardless of who is 
currently in power. 
Of course, there is also a disparity of views between citizens and MPs over 
what democracy should be and which components it should contain and guar-
antee. In the surveys we draw on in this study, citizens espouse a much broader 
vision of democracy which includes the economic-redistributive dimension to a 
great extent. By contrast, political elites put more emphasis on the procedural 
aspects of democracy. In the post-crisis wave, we have observed a partial con-
vergence of the positions of MPs and citizens regarding the economic dimen-
sion, with economic-redistributive issues increasing in salience among MPs 
and decreasing among citizens. Nevertheless, the differences between MPs and 
citizens on this question remain significant. 
Normative visions of democracy are poorly correlated with support for de-
mocracy as a political system. Satisfaction with the democratic political regime 
of the country and its performance depends primarily on the economic charac-
teristics of democracy. All four redistribution-related aspects of normative 
visions of democracy (high taxes to subsidize the poor, jobs for everyone, state 
provision of basic necessities for citizens and state aid for unemployed) 
changed after the crisis, becoming clearly associated with levels of satisfaction 
with democracy. This is in accordance with our expectation of a growing ac-
ceptance of an output-related democracy. Broader visions of democracy, inclu-
sive of the economic-redistributive dimension, lead to lower levels of support 
for democracy, in particular when government policies do not meet normative 
expectations. 
The range of differences between MPs and citizens in their normative vi-
sions of democracy and the divergence observed in the post-crisis wave of the 
study were moderated by political affiliation. While both main political forces 
were generally distant from their electorates as well as from the average voter 
in general, in the post-crisis study, PiS deputies were much more clearly at-
tuned to citizens’ ideals of redistributive democracy than were their PO coun-
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terparts. This facilitated PiS’s use of economic issues as a bargaining chip in 
the subsequent 2015 parliamentary election, a move which radically changed 
the Polish political scene. In this way, the impact of the economic crisis on 
democracy in Poland was delayed and indirect. The emphasis on generous 
redistribution policies meant that voters were relatively less interested and 
more apathetic in protesting against the new radical policies of the new ruling 
party, including the significant changes to democratic procedures, some of 
them clearly violating constitutional provisions. To be sure: this does not mean 
that the more output-related visions of democracy directly influence current 
democratic backsliding in Poland, it does however “contextually explain” the 
relative ease in dismantling the foundations of democratic rule of law after the 
2015 elections.  
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